Is this the end for Georgian Dream? 

Konstantin Ionatamishvili is chairman of the European Initiative — Georgia NGO, which focuses on the country’s democratic development and Western integration. He’s a board member of the Baltic to Black Sea Alliance and is a former elected member of the Tbilisi City Council (2010-2014).

In the spring of 2024, protests in Georgia captured the world’s attention.

Over the course of two months, the country’s citizens took to the streets of Tbilisi in their thousands, opposing their government’s anti-Western policies. And as the rest of the world observed the state’s heavy-handed response, its blunt rejection of the West’s concerns led to a halt in Georgia’s European Union accession negotiations.

With parliamentary elections set for late October, and EU membership negotiations due to start shortly thereafter, the timing of this behavior was largely puzzling. However, an even greater riddle was the ruling party’s 12-year reign: If Georgians were so passionate about Western integration, why did they keep reelecting the anti-EU Georgian Dream (GD) for more than a decade?

Under Mikhael Saakashvili’s leadership, in 2008, Georgia faced a major political setback. Despite significant democratic reforms and its active support for international military operations, Western partners didn’t grant Georgia NATO’s Membership Action Plan. And Russia’s subsequent invasion left the country devastated, while the U.S. “reset” policy with Moscow only deepened its sense of disappointment and abandonment. 

A creation of billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who had returned from Russia in 2003, GD came to power in 2012, defeating Saakashvili’s National Movement. At the time, Ivanishvili’s wealth was equal to 40.5 percent of Georgia’s GDP, guaranteeing political loyalty and encouraging wishful thinking in a country with an average monthly salary of just $450 — despite his fortune being tied to Russia. 

Meanwhile, the party itself was a political Frankenstein’s monster, assembled on a platform of growing societal grievances. Initially maintaining a pro-European front, the government turned toward anti-liberal, anti-Western policies just as Georgia appeared to deepen its EU ties. And in the years since, it has trampled human rights, silenced dissent, spread conspiracy theories and disinformation, passed a “Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence” that sparked mass protests, and doubled down on anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, fueling homophobia.

Throughout this process, GD has undermined three key pillars of the country’s security and development: Georgia has now lost its strategic partnership with the United States, which has imposed sanctions on several government officials and halted development aid and military cooperation. The EU has suspended its accession process, citing concerns over democratic backsliding. And the country has also been marginalized from NATO’s political agenda.

Moreover, while those opposing GD say Ivanishvili is acting in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interests, another actor is increasing its presence in the country: China.

China isn’t perceived as an existential threat to Georgia’s future the way Russia is, and Georgians have now grown accustomed to Chinese companies consistently winning large state infrastructure tenders. Meanwhile, as critical media and the opposition remain fixated on fighting Russia’s malign influence via the ruling party, they’ve been overlooking the political consequences of the government’s active economic engagement with Beijing.

For example, in July 2023, Georgia announced a strategic partnership with China, joining two of its new platforms: the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative. Then, in May 2024, GD gave away the construction of a deep-sea port in Anaklia to a Chinese state-owned company, strengthening Beijing’s influence both in Georgia and in the wider Black Sea region. And in July, Ivanishvili delivered a public speech, lavishly thanking China for its support, which, he noted, the party had worked for years to obtain.

Of course, Georgia’s main international objective remains the nonrecognition policy of its Russia-occupied territories and the return of internally displaced persons. However, just a month and a half before Ivanishvili’s speech, China abstained from voting on the respective United Nations resolution. (Unsurprisingly, he didn’t relay any gratitude to the U.S., either — even though Washington has constantly supported Georgia’s territorial integrity in all international forums.)

Still, in a bid to politically distance Georgia from the West, dampen Western business interest in the country and lay the groundwork for China’s deeper involvement, party leaders — particularly Ivanishvili — have increasingly framed their stance as a pragmatic choice. They argue that in light of the West’s alleged decline, betting on China is in Georgia’s national interest, all while demonizing the West in official party rhetoric.

But could this weekend’s election finally bring an end to “Ivanishvili’s dream”?

Polls indicate that four opposition groups have a realistic chance of surpassing the 5 percent threshold, collectively securing more support than GD. Their discourse is pro-Western — albeit cautious on sensitive topics in a largely conservative society. And an opposition victory would mark a turn toward more democratic governance and renewed political and economic ties with the West.

However, the ruling party knows Georgian voters bear unhealed scars — not only from the 2008 war with Russia but also from the wars of the 1990s. Their election campaign focused heavily on the false dichotomy between the “warmongering” West and GD’s brand of peace and stability. They’ve also been framing the West as undermining Georgian identity and core values, as resistance to women’s rights, religious and ethnic diversity, and LGBTQ+ inclusion persist in more conservative segments of society. 

And in an economically impoverished state, such fear-mongering can be quite effective.

Yet, change may well be in the air. The spring protests were a tangible manifestation of support for the country’s Western orientation, showing that the younger generation is politically active and wants to live a European dream — not Ivanishvili’s nightmare. Additionally — as the West has made clear — if GD were to stay in power, it would mean the end of political and economic support for Georgia, which would have a devastating effect on the well-being of its citizens. 

Twelve years of one-party rule has, of course, driven the country back into corruption and state capture, making GD more difficult to oppose. But civil society is highly motivated and organized to ensure a fair election and expose any attempts to falsify votes, and thousands of citizens are registering as election observers. Thus, Western support for election observation, independent Georgian media and civil society organizations is more important than ever.

If the opposition can demonstrate unity, and if voters know that their choices are well-protected by local election observers and Western partners, there is hope. I, personally, believe it’s impossible to establish an authoritarian regime in Georgia — it goes against the free spirit of our nation. And despite the dire circumstances, we’re more progressive and more prepared for European transformation than at any other time in our independent history.